(from the series “Trump’s America and the New World Order”, part 13)
The war in Ukraine has entered its final act, and that is a direct result of Trump’s policies, that he has been pursuing since his election as US President for a second term.
According to US Secretary of State Rubio, Trump was initially convinced that this war “must be ended.” Trump viewed the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as a “protracted, stalemate,” as a “proxy war between nuclear powers, in which the United States is helping Ukraine, in a war with Russia.”
In fact, starting in March 2025, the White House began to withdraw from the conflict. The meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul on May 16 and the subsequent telephone conversation between Trump and Putin finally launched the final act of the war.
However, there is important aspect to Trump’s policy. As investor and developer, Trump does not invest his personal capital in his projects. He always uses external sources of financing. Therefore, he does not intend to spend US money on Ukraine, and he started returning the money that Biden spent on the war in Ukraine.
The meeting in Istanbul took place exactly three years after Zelensky, in 2022, refused to sign a peace agreement already agreed upon in the same Istanbul by the delegations of Russia and Ukraine. And Biden was behind that Zelensky’s decision.
The Istanbul talks in May 2025, were fundamentally different from the previous ones. In Istanbul-2, all parties to the conflict, not only Putin and Zelensky, but also Trump and European leaders, were invisibly but actively involved. And the fact that all leaders of the parties actively showed their involvement and their interest in the negotiations was the result of the “four-handed game” by Trump and Putin.
For three years, Zelensky refused any negotiations with Russia. Moreover, he issued a special Presidential Decree prohibiting all Ukrainians from negotiating with Russia. Calling for negotiations in Ukraine was punishable by prison terms. Zelensky was supported by Biden, who never spoke to Putin since the invasion.
Since 2014, starting with the Minsk agreements, the US, while actively supporting Kyiv, has been avoiding direct participation in the negotiations. Washington was controlling, determining and blocking the negotiations, but created the impression that it was outside and above the negotiation process.
Having replaced Biden in the White House, Trump could only leave the war if he forced the parties to start peace talks and thus showed himself to be a peacemaker. Only with such a result, Trump would have the opportunity to leave the war, leaving responsibility for the outcome of the war to Kyiv, Moscow and European countries.
And Putin helped Trump. They played “four hands”, forcing Zelensky and his European allies to get involved in the negotiation process, making them believe that they were driving Putin and Trump into a trap.
Putin even had to forget and renounce Zelensky’s illegitimacy, and stop insisting on cancellation by Zelensky of his Decree banning negotiations with Russia. Putin did all that, playing along with Trump, and they managed to involve Zelensky and European leaders in the negotiation process, in Istanbul 2.
However, Istanbul-2 showed that Ukraine and Russia cannot directly conclude an agreement without the defeat of one of the parties. Istanbul 2 also proved that peace was possible only through an agreement between Russia and the United States, because the conditions of peace are to be determined not by the relations of Ukraine with Russia and not by the relations of Russia and Europe, but precisely by the relations between the United States and Russia.
Moreover, if the White House and the Kremlin agree to a speedy end to military action, it will be very difficult, almost impossible, for those parties to the conflict who do not agree with Moscow and Washington to continue the war.
However, ending the war turned out more difficult than Trump had expected. And the main difficulties are created by the contradictions in the attitude of the opposing sides to the conflict itself, in their understanding of its causes, level and depth of confrontation. Moreover, the understanding of the nature of the war differs most between Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and the West, on the other hand.
For Russia and Ukraine, the conflict has risen to the level of an existential threat, to the level of a war in which Russia or Ukraine could lose their civilizational code, the foundation of their state systems, and this war could wipe out the ruling clans and elites.
In Russia, the war is perceived as an invasion of the West into historical Russian territory, the Russian world, as one of challenges that Russia has faced many times in its history. Russia believes that the West is only using the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian nationalists and people to fight Russia.
The last public opinion poll conducted in Russia after Istanbul 2 negotiations, showed that Russians do not consider Ukraine as their main enemy. Ukraine ranks only fourth on the list of enemies for Russian people. 1st place is occupied by France, 2nd place by Great Britain, Germany ranks 3rd, and Poland comes 5th after Ukraine on the list of Russia’s enemies. Trump’s America has moved in few months from first place to 6th, the last place that closes the list of enemy states. The trend is clear and visible…
In Ukraine, the war is perceived as an invasion by Russia aimed at destroying the emerging statehood, the forming national elite, and Ukrainianism as the ruling ideology.
Before the invasion, Putin and his entourage did not expect to face such a threat and such a level of resistance. They did not understand the nature and depth of the contradictions between Russian civilization and Ukrainianism, that with Moscow’s connivance, grew from a radical and marginal nationalist wing into the state ideology of the ruling elites and majority of population. Putin and his entourage also underestimated the West’s determination to support Ukraine.
It was precisely the underestimation by Putin and his clan of the civilizational factor, the depth of the contradictions between Ukrainianism, based on nationalism, and Russian civilization, which was created and exists on the territorial-communal principle of organization and the multi-nationality of Russia as state, that led to Putin launching the invasion, underestimating the ability of Ukrainian nationalists to resist, their tenacity and readiness for self-sacrifice.
For the Kremlin, for Putin personally, for the elites, and over time, as the military actions became more violent, for most of the peoples of Russia, the war in Ukraine became an existential threat. All other interests, including economic, political and state ones, were pushed aside and became secondary in comparison to the war.
This explains the readiness of Putin and his entourage to sacrifice interests that were considered strategic and priority only three years ago. This explains, for example, Putin’s readiness to hand over Syria to Turkey, Israel and the United States, leaving only Russian military bases in Syria.
Protecting the Assad regime has become a secondary task for the Kremlin, but military bases can play an important role if the conflict in Ukraine escalates into a full-scale war with the West, so Russia is ready to fight for its military bases. Also, the current situation in and around Syria gives the Kremlin more options and a free hand for strategic play in the Middle East.
This explains Moscow’s support for Trump’s policy towards Iran, that is aimed at preventing Tehran from producing nuclear weapons, reducing Iran’s influence in the Middle East, but at the same time restoring American-Iranian economic relations that will allow Iranian oil to fully return to the world market through American companies and ensure a reduction in world prices for oil and electricity, that is a priority for Trump and his team during the transition of the US economy and financial system to a new technological order.
At the same time, Moscow is creating a military-political alliance with Tehran, capable of ensuring the protection of Russia’s strategic interests, primarily military ones, in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and, if necessary, in the Middle East.
This also explains the “indifference” of the Kremlin, Putin personally and his government to the sanctions that the West has been introducing all three years of the war. Financial and economic losses are of secondary importance for Putin and the Kremlin precisely because Russia faces an existential threat, and the war in Ukraine is capable of escalating into a full-scale nuclear conflict that Moscow is preparing for.
Sanctions are viewed by Moscow as restrictive and hostile actions, but they do not pose the existential threat to Russia and Putin that the war in Ukraine poses, if this war escalates into a nuclear conflict with the United States.
This also explains Moscow’s attitude to the Agreement between the United States and Ukraine on the establishment of Investment fund (the mineral deal). In fact, Putin and the Kremlin actively supported this Agreement, although it extends American legislation to the territory of Ukraine, the territory of historical Russia.
Moscow is satisfied with Kiev transferring the Ukrainian gas transportation system under control of the US Investment fund. That will allow American companies to use the Ukrainian pipelines for the transportation and sale of Russian gas to Europe. Putin and Gazprom have been trying for several years to transfer the Ukrainian gas transportation system under the joint management, but Kyiv did not agree to this.
Now the idle gas pipelines, including the Nord Streams, oil pipelines, the world’s largest underground gas storage facilities, all this legacy of the Soviet Union, will be sold at the price of scrap metal to the American fund and transferred to the management of American companies that will buy gas in Russia at a price 2.5 times lower than the price of gas in Europe and sell it to European consumers.
And this suits Moscow in the current situation, because Trump will ensure uninterrupted supply of Russian energy resources to Europe, and in the event of a drop in European demand, to other regions of the world where the economy and energy rapidly develop.
At the same time, Moscow hopes that over time the American-Ukrainian fund will also become Russian. After peace comes to Ukraine, Russia will have very large opportunities to influence the situation, prices, and American corporations will be interested not so much in maintaining control over Ukraine, but in developing American-Russian business cooperation.
The existential nature of the threat from Ukraine, the Zelensky regime, and the growing ferocity of military actions explain Moscow’s “weak” reaction to the freezing of Russian assets, including nearly $300 billion in European bank accounts. The freeze is sensitive and unpleasant for Moscow, but does not pose a threat to the economy, the regime, or the existence of Russia as a state.
Moreover, the freezing of these assets was the result of mistakes by the Kremlin, Putin’s inner circle and him personally during the period of preparation for the invasion and the beginning of the special operation, and Putin does not want to return to this topic, to arrange showdowns, investigations about these assets.
The freeze is viewed by Moscow as a temporary sanction, and escalating tension around these assets is not in the interests of Putin personally, or those who squandered these billions of dollars. It is better for them to remain silent and quietly try to return this money to the Russian budget.
For example, these frozen assets can be directed to the Investment fund that Washington is creating in Ukraine. That money can be used to restore and develop the destroyed transport facilities, including ports, and energy infrastructure in the territories that became part of Russia, as investments of Russian corporations through the US-Ukrainian fund. This might have already been discussed and agreed upon with Whitkoff, or even with Trump.
However, if the frozen assets are confiscated by the EU and sent to Ukraine, for example, to purchase weapons, this decision by the West could radically change the situation. For Moscow, as well as for the majority of the Russian population, this will be an act of aggression, a war. Putin will be forced to act as decisively as possible both towards those who make such a decision and towards those in his inner circle who allowed such a situation to happen.
In the event of asset confiscation, Moscow may decide to confiscate the properties and assets of all European companies and banks, as well as to strike targets, use military force, directly and through proxies, against companies and organizations of the countries that have confiscated the assets.
The existential level of the war in Ukraine explains the strategy and tactics of the military actions that Russia is waging. Putin needs people of Russia to feel negative consequences of the war as little as possible. The flow of volunteers to the front allows Moscow to avoid mobilization, so that the war lasts as a special operation and is not perceived as a strategic mistake.
Moscow needs to exhaust and to blow up Ukraine from within. If the population of Ukraine at the collapse of the USSR exceeded 50 million people, and in 2021 it was about 42 million, in 2024 the population of Ukraine did not exceed 20 million, and over 5 million Ukrainians moved to Russia. After the invasion, martial law has been introduced in Ukraine, and the majority of the population does not have the right to travel abroad.
Zelensky not only cannot defeat Russia without the West, he cannot continue the war, and this explains all his actions. He must put the West, including the United States, in a situation where the war in Ukraine becomes an existential threat for the West, where the death of the Zelensky regime will mean the death of the West, and Kyiv’s victory in the war with Russia will be the salvation of Washington, Brussels, London, Paris and Berlin…
However, for the West, including the US and Europe, this war is a regional war. It is considered an important conflict, but it has not yet risen to the level of an existential threat. The difference in the scale of participation in the military actions of the West and the direct participants in the military actions, Ukraine and Russia, as well as the level of threats to the states, peoples and ruling elites was the main factor that determined the course of the war, and remains the most important factor that will determine the terms of a peace agreement.
The only criterion by which the parties maintain a common approach is restraint in the use of weapons, excluding the use of nuclear weapons and the most powerful conventional weapons. However, the war has reached a point where this restraint can be violated.
One of the main results of Istanbul-2 was the understanding that another breakdown of negotiations would almost inevitably lead to a sharp increase in the level of use of weapons and the intensity of military operations.
The signal to Zelensky and Europe that failure to negotiate would lead to a sharp increase in the level of Russian use of lethal weapons, which could cause unacceptable damage to Ukraine and to which Europe has no adequate response, was sent not only by the Kremlin, but also by Washington.
The Kremlin has put on alert the Kapustin Yar test site, from which Oreshnik ballistic missiles with multiple warheads are launched, each with six warheads, capable of destroying without the use of nuclear weapons any structure, including underground to a depth of 100 meters.
At the same time, Putin appointed General Andrei Mordvichyov as commander of the Russian Ground Forces, a long-awaited purge of the command staff in Russia. That means rapid modernization and reform of the ground forces and increased command efficiency.
Mordvichyov showed himself in Ukraine as the most successful and effective commander of troops. He became known as “General Breakthrough” during the capture of Mariupol, then commanded the taking over of Avdiivka, the offensive in Donbass. Mordvichyov demonstrated his determination, extreme toughness, efficiency, including the fact that his troops took Ukrainian cities well-prepared for defence with 1:1 ratio of troops, with the standard number of attackers to defenders of 5:1.
General Valeriy Solodchuk, who commanded the liberation from Ukrainian troops of territory in Russia’s Kursk region, that Zelensky planned to exchange during negotiations for the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the adjacent territory, has been appointed commander of Russian troops in Donbass in place of Mordvichyov.
The Russian Armed Forces, including the command, are becoming increasingly irreconcilable opponents of Ukraine and the West, especially European countries and their leaders. The radicalisation of the Russian army became the most important political factor in modern Russia. It is this trend that will determine the composition of the post-Putin elites and the policies of the new rulers in the Kremlin in coming years.
However, the most important signal for Istanbul-2 was from Washington. Trump made it clear that the US does not intend to get involved in a large-scale conflict with Russia that could cross the line into a global nuclear conflict. Trump and his team demanded a rapid end to hostilities and showed their readiness to conclude strategic agreements with Moscow, primarily in the economic sphere. For Trump, economics determines politics.
