In Russia, people are asking: why do officials—who formally advocate for the development of IT and messaging apps—actually strive to herd the internet into the «stables» of state corporations or private companies controlled by officials, placing it under the total control of security services? All of this is unfolding under the banner of creating a «Sovereign Internet.»
For too long, Russia developed its internet and communication tools by relying on Western messengers, platforms, servers, and smartphones, such as the iPhone. While Russian secured messengers and equipment were created for defenсe and intelligence services, the general population and businesses spent decades using Western and Chinese counterparts.
The war in Ukraine, the rise of terrorism, the threat of direct war with the West, the upcoming State Duma elections, and the presidential power transfer—occurring against a backdrop of a degrading political system, an inefficient economy, and Putin’s waning popularity—have forced the Kremlin to reconsider a «Sovereign Internet.»
It began with the blocking of YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, and other platforms. This caused limited protests and discontent, which the authorities explained as a necessary fight against Western propaganda, Ukrainian terrorists, and foreign agents.
However, the authorities then moved to block Telegram, sparking an explosion of protest. It turned out that 65 million Russians use Telegram as their primary messenger, including military personnel and the population in frontline territories who rely on it to contact family and receive urgent alerts about Ukrainian drone attacks.
In response to the block, the population engaged in organized resistance, creating a sophisticated system to bypass restrictions and bans. Moreover, members of the highest levels of state power were unwilling to give up their Western smartphones and Telegram, carving out exceptions for themselves. This hypocrisy fuelled even greater public outrage.
In retaliation, Roskomnadzor (the agency responsible for internet control) stopped targeting individual resources or VPN servers and began testing a «Whitelist» model. This is a fundamentally different approach: instead of filtering prohibited content, providers transition to allowing only permitted content.
This has only multiplied problems and protests. Approximately ten million Russians earn their living directly through the internet; any interference leads to irrevocable financial losses for them. Furthermore, imposing restrictions on a population that has built a vast system of resistance has disrupted the work of banks, corporations, and eventually the entire administrative system.
It has become clear that instead of development, officials are imposing a blatant absurdity upon Russia: “Cyber-Apartheid”. A debate has emerged: where does this absurdity come from, and what are its roots?
In these disputes, inquisitive minds have discovered a striking historical parallel with the 1960s in the USSR. Back then, the Soviet bureaucracy reasoned similarly: «Televisions, cars, and apartments can be personal, but a computer cannot. A computer is immense state power; it must belong to the ministries.» At that moment, the Soviet Union was not just keeping pace with the USA—it was ahead.
The IBM «Luhansk» Connection
It is a little-known fact that the ideas of the personal computer, which later made IBM famous, relied heavily on Soviet developments. In the Luhansk region of the Ukrainian SSR, within the defence complex, electronic computers (such as the «Mir» series) were produced. Their characteristics were an order of magnitude higher than Western counterparts of that time. Americans bought up these samples and studied them, using that foundation to launch their own computer revolution.
In the USSR, however, the slogan «We don’t need this for everyone» prevailed. This was not merely a mistake—it was ideological sabotage by the bureaucracy against its own future.
Ghosts of the Past: Bogdanov vs. Lenin
To understand the roots of this problem, one must look at a conflict I described in my book, *The Secret History of Communism in Russia* (available at ValeryMorozov.com — https://valerymorozov.com/shop, Lulu — https://www.lulu.com/account/projects, https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/bookshelf ).
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Bolshevik Party had two leaders who became rivals:
1. Vladimir Lenin focused on the seizure of power and class struggle.
2. Alexander Bogdanov, the true ideologist of early Bolshevism, looked deeper and sought to develop Marxism using the rapid advances in natural sciences of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Bogdanov created «Tektology»—a universal organizational science. He viewed society not merely as an arena for class struggle, but as a single system. He predicted the internet, television, computerization, and even flights to Mars (his novel “Red Star” was published in 1908).
Bogdanov’s core message was the emancipation of human intelligence and creativity. Technology was meant to give every individual the resources for personal development. Along this path, Bogdanov laid the foundations of cybernetics, general systems theory, genetics, and information science.
Lenin considered Bogdanov’s pursuits harmful, distracting the party from the fight for power. He dismissed Bogdanov’s views as «subjective idealism.» Late in life, Lenin acknowledged Bogdanov’s foresight and even approved the creation of the world’s first blood transfusion institute in 1922 based on Bogdanov’s systemic ideas. However, after Lenin’s death in 1924, only his criticisms remained in official history, leading cybernetics and genetics to be branded for decades as the «handmaidens of imperialism.»
Bureaucracy as the New Ruling Class
Why were Bogdanov’s ideas sidelined while computers in the USSR remained «closed» within the defence complex? Because after the revolution, instead of the «withering away of the state» (as Marx wrote), the worst version of the bourgeois apparatus was restored: the party and state bureaucracy.
The bureaucracy quickly realized that the development of individual intelligence and independent communication is death to their power. They only support what strengthens control: massive defence mainframes, closed systems, and state corporations.
The Tragedy of Today’s «Communists»
It is astonishing how little the current «Left» in Russia (including the Communist party of RF) knows of its own history. They support state corporations, calling them «the people’s property.» This is a lie. There is a clear distinction: «State Property» vs. «Public Property.»
A state corporation today is an anti-communist structure. It is a tool for officials who have transformed into a class of owners. They block the free internet not because it is harmful, but because it threatens the state machine by prioritizing individual intelligence and public interest.
Systemic Deadlock
The current «swamp» within the Russian elites is the historical successor to the Khrushchev-Brezhnev stagnation that smothered the Soviet computer revolution.
The world is entering a new technological cycle where the primary currencies are culture, intellect, and social capital. Yet, the Russian state system continues to play its game of «restrain and forbid.» This is no longer about the personal qualities of rulers; it is an internal characteristic of the system—the struggle of an archaic bureaucracy against the future. Until the state is transformed from an apparatus of coercion into a platform for human development, Russia will be doomed to play catch-up with those to whom it once gave the very ideas they now use.
The Kremlin faces the task of fundamentally changing the architecture of the state. It is time to finally understand: the future belongs to the individual and the public, not the official and the bureaucracy.
