The current stage of geopolitical confrontation has revealed a deep, systemic similarity in the evolution of the state apparatuses of both Russia and Ukraine. In the face of a protracted conflict and extraordinary challenges, both countries have arrived at the exact same point of institutional development: the formation of an all-encompassing «corporation of intelligence services,» which has become the primary backbone, brain, and arbiter of state power.
This trend did not emerge out of nowhere. It is a direct continuation of hidden historical processes rooted in the Soviet past, now adapted to the realities of the 21st century with its cyber warfare, information dominance, and unmanned technologies.
Historical Genesis: From the VChK to the Collapse of the USSR and the «Yeltsin Clan»
The roots of today’s dominance by the intelligence services lie in the hidden history of communism, which I described in my book The Secret History of Communism in Russia (ValeryMorozov.com — https://valerymorozov.com/shop, Lulu — https://www.lulu.com/account/projects, Amazon KDP — https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/bookshelf).
Established in December 1917 as a temporary and strictly executive body to combat official sabotage and black-market speculation, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) set off the formation of an autonomous, heavy-handed security superstructure. Among the party elite of the Lenin era, the Cheka-OGPU was viewed with a degree of irony; the first Chekists were often compared to the radicals of the French Revolution who ran the risk of ending up on the guillotine themselves.
However, that irony proved shortsighted. The system they created gradually outgrew party control. It was precisely this closed «corporation of intelligence services» (which later evolved into the KGB and GRU) that played a decisive role in destabilizing and ultimately dismantling the USSR, and subsequently—in reshaping the architecture of power in the new Russia.
In the 1990s, a myth about the «omnipotence of the oligarchs» dominated expert circles and the media. In reality, the so-called first-wave oligarchs (including Boris Berezovsky) initially performed a purely practical function—they served as financial «wallets» for intra-Kremlin security factions, specifically for Alexander Korzhakov, head of the Presidential Security Service (SBP), and Mikhail Barsukov, director of the Main Directorate of Security, and later, — director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSB).
The full-scale emergence of the oligarchs into the foreground in 1996 was the result of a fierce conflict within the Kremlin. This clash pitted the leadership of the intelligence services and the Yeltsin clan against representatives of Western (primarily American) corporations involved in the reconstruction of the Grand Kremlin Palace and other facilities managed by the Presidential Property Management Department of the Russian Federation. The financial injection of approximately $400 billion required for Boris Yeltsin to hold onto power came with a strict condition from the West: purge «the Family» of the influence of the intelligence services that controlled key economic streams.
The result of this showdown was the high-profile firing of Korzhakov, Barsukov, and their ally, Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets (the infamous «photocopier box case»), as well as the arrest of the Presidential Property Manager, Pavel Borodin, in the United States. All of this forced the intelligence services to pivot to a more subtle, long-term strategy. The ultimate result of this strategy was the transit of power at the turn of the 2000s from Yeltsin to Putin—who was a representative of the security bloc, a fact kept secret all those years.
The Russian Vector: The Digital Fortress of the FSO
The rise to power of individuals from the security services in the early 2000s was marked by a period of adaptation. In those years, the intelligence chiefs who came in with Putin to replace the «Yeltsin-era» managers were often poorly versed in breakthrough civilian technologies. Inside the Kremlin, ironic anecdotes circulated about cyber-security meetings where security generals openly admitted: «We are guards, we watch brick walls. We don’t need brains; we just need to know how to hit or shoot. Thinking is hazardous for us.»
(One of these episodes is described in my book The Kremlin Guards (Streltsy) — ValeryMorozov.com — https://valerymorozov.com/shop, Lulu — https://www.lulu.com/account/projects, Amazon KDP — https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/bookshelf — VM)
By 2026, the situation has reversed completely. Information security, control over the airwaves, and defence against technological threats have transformed the Main Department of Security, later – the Federal Protective Service (FSO) from an agency of «physical barriers» into an overarching element of state administration.
- Personnel Explosion: Since the beginning of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the FSO’s central apparatus has been expanded four times. The latest emergency staff increase in mid-2026 points to the emergence of massive operational tasks that require immediate attention.
- Technological Totalitarianism: The concept of protecting top officials has morphed into total environmental control. The FSO has been granted powers to regulate civilian communication frequencies (going as far as shutting down LTE base stations to facilitate Electronic Warfare operations) and to coordinate nationwide anti-drone programs.
- The Information Filter: Transferring the functions of coordinating the «112» emergency services system to the FSO means that the agency has centralized the primary collection of data regarding any emergencies, man-made disasters, and social risks across the state. This makes it the sole monopolist in presenting an objective picture of the domestic situation to the country’s top leadership.
The Ukrainian Accent: The Birth of «Smersh 2.0»
In Ukraine, the process of the intelligence services corporatizing state power lagged behind, but under the conditions of full-scale war, it took on ultra-radical forms. Martial law, which put classic party politics and elections on pause, led to the dismantling of the old oligarchic-parliamentary model.
A monolithic security centre has solidified around Volodymyr Zelensky, which can be described as «Smersh 2.0.» Key positions in the state have been occupied by career intelligence officers:
- Personnel Dominance: Key agencies have come under the direct control of security veterans: the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) is headed by Oleksandr Poklad, the GUR (Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD) by Oleh Ivashchenko, and the Ministry of Defence by Yevhen Khmara.
- Intercepting the Office of the President: A crucial milestone in overcoming the infighting among the Kyiv elite was the appointment of the former head of the GUR, Kyrylo Budanov, as the head of the Office of the President. This finalized the creation of a purely security-driven core around the head of state.
- Hybrid Diplomacy: The Security Service and military intelligence have entirely usurped the traditional functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They now independently conduct negotiations regarding prisoner swaps, resource transit, weapons procurement, and strategic contacts with both the West and the Global South.
The main difference between the Ukrainian model and the Russian one is its deliberate media presence. Ukrainian security officials have become public figures, fixtures on television broadcasts, and primary newsmakers. They exercise complete control over the national information landscape, call centres, and the cyber perimeter (including the monitoring of the Telegram ecosystem through the integration of databases like the «Obereg» conscription registry).
The Main Paradox of the Security Vertical: A Crisis of Strategy
Despite the outward stability and rigidity of the systems established in Moscow and Kyiv, they carry a fundamental vulnerability characteristic of any intelligence service corporation.
By their institutional nature, intelligence officers are highly qualified executors. They are capable of executing tactical operations, suppressing internal opposition, building security perimeters, and protecting assets. However, they are organically incapable of generating long-term socio-political strategies, economic reforms, or visions for the future.
Volodymyr Zelensky, coming from a show business background, operates within a reactive, operational logic—much like the leaders of his security bloc. A state system deprived of an influx of independent intellectual thought turns into a blind executor of the will of external handlers. In Ukraine’s case, this is the Western intelligence community (CIA, MI6), which closely shepherds the local security apparatus.
Meanwhile, a hypothesis regarding a so-called «intelligence service conspiracy» is increasingly voiced within the expert communities of Ukraine and Russia alike. Because direct and informal channels of communication between the professional security apparatuses of Russia and Ukraine (as well as their Western counterparts) were never entirely severed for resolving sensitive issues—such as swaps, raw material transit, and the prevention of nuclear incidents—it is these closed corporations that could ultimately become the entities that cut a deal behind the backs of nominal political leaders.
In both Moscow and Kyiv, the «Intelligence Leviathan» is devouring—or has already devoured—traditional politics. Yet, by building flawless digital and physical fortresses, the security officials have trapped themselves. For these systems to survive, they desperately need civilian intellectuals capable of proposing at least some strategy to escape the global deadlock. A viable future cannot be built on orders, frequency bans, and counterintelligence regimes alone.
