(Why the American Mechanics of “Forcing Compliance” Often Fail in Ukraine, and Why Negotiations in New York Could Lead to Yet Another Deadlock)

The end of September 2026 marks a fundamental turning point not only in the confrontation between Russia and the West, but also in the very architecture of international conflict management. The events surrounding Volodymyr Zelensky’s diplomatic tour—ranging from a quiet meeting in Ireland with CIA Director John Ratcliffe to negotiations with Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York—have transcended the boundaries of routine foreign policy.

To grasp the underlying meaning of what is unfolding, one must consider not only the specific traits and mindsets of Western, Russian, and Ukrainian diplomacy and intelligence services, but also the traditional models of agreement and political culture inherent to their peoples.

1. The Meeting in Ireland: Intelligence Service Logic and a Hard Ultimatum

The pivotal moment of the current crisis occurred not in the public offices of New York, but at an intermediate stopover in Ireland. Zelensky’s meeting with CIA Director John Ratcliffe carried the tone of a harsh «interrogation».

Ratcliffe is not a classic diplomat oriented toward searching for compromises. He represents a structure that operates in the language of dossiers detailing unlawful activities, financial transfers, and hidden assets. The reason for his direct involvement is that Washington’s political and diplomatic arguments have been exhausted.

It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that financial documents, offshore accounting records, and lists of foreign real estate belonging to Zelensky himself and the inner circle of the Kyiv leadership were placed on the table before the Ukrainian president.

Ratcliffe framed a classic Anglo-Saxon ultimatum: either direct submission to U.S. strategy or exposure, indictments, and total legal and financial liquidation.

In the American frame of reference, this «fork in the road» leaves only two scenarios:

• The First Option (Forced Compliance): Rejection of Washington’s terms leads to the confiscation of foreign assets, their transfer to a U.S.-controlled fund and subsequently to Ukraine’s budget, alongside the launching of a series of criminal prosecutions.
• The Second Option (Managed Exit): Agreement to an energy truce, launching negotiations aimed at ending the war and establishing a lasting peace, holding elections in Ukraine, and transferring power to a figure agreed upon by Washington (such as Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Kyrylo Budanov, or Mykhailo Fedorov) in exchange for security guarantees.

2. The Mechanics of «Kremlin Showdowns» and Corporate Pressure

Donald Trump increasingly encounters problems arising from the fact that his habitual style collides with the national political mindsets of foreign leaders. The meeting between Trump and Zelensky scheduled in New York is a vivid demonstration of how the traditional American mechanism of «pressure and deal» loses its rhythm when an opponent employs the tactic of ostensible agreement followed by sabotage.

In the corporate and public sectors of the United States, a specific strategy for resolving acute conflicts has been honed over centuries. When the American system catches a partner from post-Soviet countries engaging in corruption, legal violations, or errors followed by the siphoning of funds to the West or hidden money-laundering schemes, it acts according to a set algorithm:

1. Documenting Violations: Gathering an evidentiary base (bank transfers, account numbers, addresses of purchased real estate).
2. Applying Pressure and Creating a «Hard Fork»: Issuing an ultimatum from a position of strength—either complete legal and financial destruction or a controlled retreat on U.S. terms.
3. Leaving an «Exit Window»: Granting the subject the opportunity to save face or preserve physical freedom, but exclusively within a pre-marked corridor.

This system works in business and in relations with rational actors. A classic real-world example from the 1990s—which I described in my book Entering the Kremlin—took place during closed-door negotiations in the Moscow Kremlin regarding the disappearance of millions of dollars during the reconstruction of the Grand Kremlin Palace. When the financial manager of an American corporation presented Russian security officials involved in the embezzlement with precise data on the potential seizure of their foreign property, the intelligence leadership was forced to admit defeat and accept the proposed terms.

In the American worldview, once the word «agreed» is spoken, the case is considered closed.

3. The Civilizational Gap Between Three Mindsets

The primary reason Trump’s attempts to force Zelensky into a binding deal may fall apart lies in a deep disregard for the civilizational characteristics of the conflict participants’ mindsets. Different political cultures perceive the very concept of an «agreement» in fundamentally different ways:

1. The Anglo-Saxon Model (US / UK / EU)

Grounded in contract law and the balance of power. Western actors construct a rigid framework (a «fork»), offer the opponent a choice, and abide by the terms as long as the system maintains stability. If parameters shift, a new agreement is reached, and the laws and rules themselves are rewritten—but strictly within the legal field and the frameworks achieved during the struggle.

B. The Russian Civilizational Model

Traces its origins to the mindset of territorial communes, transformed through the periods of the Tsardom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and the USSR, where two mental models existed and interacted like a Russian matryoshka doll: the communal and the state-centric. Within this matryoshka, the interests of the state prevailed alongside communal traditions regarding the inviolability of one’s word and accepted obligations. Once a decision is made and a direction chosen («we agreed»), the system follows that path to the end. Byzantine scheming for internal interests is permitted within the framework of the contract, but the baseline fact of the deal is recognized as a constant (expressed in the popular idiom: «a promise made is a promise kept», or as Lavrov put it: “The guy said, the guy did it”).

C. The Ukrainian Model («Cossack Free-For-All»)

Historically formed under borderland conditions characterized by the absence of an independent state, shifting protectorates (the Ancient Rus, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire), and the institution of the Cossack council (rada). This is a culture of rapid, momentary choice («Lyubo!»), where a decision made by the majority is not considered an eternal obligation and can be altered by a new decision reflecting the immediate will of the majority. The opinion of the inner circle’s majority is paramount and dominant. This exact tradition forms the core of «Ukrainian democracy.»

4. The «Window and Attic» Phenomenon: The Strategy of Sabotage

The problem for Trump and his negotiating team lies in their attempt to apply a classic corporate framework to the political elite in Kyiv.

The Americans set rigid parameters: sign the agreed-upon peace deal, cease strikes on energy infrastructure (refineries), return the funds, or accept Washington’s terms. At the negotiating table, Zelensky may demonstrate compliance and even state publicly: «Yes, we reached an agreement; we stand for peace, only one or two points remain to be settled». The American side logs a success, assuming the «corridor» has worked.

However, the opinions and interests of not only Zelensky personally, but also the majority of his “inner circle”, then come into play—triggering the psychology of sabotage through compliance. Having received an open «exit» from Trump, the Ukrainian team pretends to walk through it, but immediately attempts to «jump out the window, crawl through the attic, and sneak up behind the negotiators.»

A striking confirmation of this unfolded on the eve of the UN General Assembly. Despite direct signals from Washington to halt escalation in order to preserve the negotiating backdrop, Ukraine carried out attacks utilizing 1,600 drones and missiles in a single day, including strikes on the Kapotnya oil refinery in the Moscow Region. Over 24 hours of strikes, resources totalling $160 million were expended for minimal operational impact, yet the main objective was achieved: damage to a major refinery, striking visuals, and a demonstrative disruption of diplomatic agreements.

5. Three Escalation Scenarios and the European Context

An analysis of the reasons why Zelensky opted for direct escalation immediately prior to his face-to-face meeting with Trump points to three potential motivations:

• An Attempt to Raise the Stakes: Demonstrating «independence» and attempting to show Washington that steamrolling Kyiv without accounting for its personal interests will fail, while ignoring its position will result in unmanageable chaos.
• Pressure from External Players (Inner Circle): Executing instructions from «partners» or Trump’s American and European political opponents, for whom a swift, enforced launch of a Washington–Moscow peace agreement is categorically disadvantageous.
• A Desperate Move Before the Inevitable: Realizing that Trump has already decided to replace the political leadership in Kyiv, prompting an attempt to provoke a final rupture in order to shift the blame for defeat onto the United States.

At the same time, the room for maneuver for Zelensky’s inner circle in Europe is shrinking rapidly:

• Germany: An internal political crisis is turning Friedrich Merz and the leadership of the traditional parties into heavyweights of a bygone era. Demands are growing louder within opposition and expert circles in the FRG to conduct investigations into key infrastructure sabotage (including Nord Stream), restore energy imports from Russia, and shift financial losses onto the party that initiated the crisis.
• France: The shift in the political balance in favour of right-wing forces (the structures of Marine Le Pen) inevitably leads to a revision of aid volumes and a shift in rhetoric regarding Kyiv along American lines.
• U.S. Audit Pressure: Demands to return funds spent by the previous U.S. administration are shifting from campaign slogans into the official stance of the White House.

Conclusion

The story of the closed-door negotiations in the Kremlin during the 1990s and today’s diplomatic duel in New York teach a legal and political truth: any strategy of «forcing compliance» in Russia and Ukraine works only when the opponent is left with no open crack for maneuver. Yet even in that situation, an opponent may dig in and refuse to compromise.

By the time of his meeting with Donald Trump in New York, Zelensky arrived as a leader whose capacity for independent maneuver before Washington had been exhausted. The conversation with Trump served merely as a formal ratification of what had already been dictated by Ratcliffe in Ireland. However, the fundamental error of the White House lies in its conviction that an accepted ultimatum automatically guarantees its execution.

The U.S. is attempting to manage the Ukrainian crisis through corporate methods, trapping the leadership in «financial forks.» Yet without recognizing that Ukraine has forged its own political culture—where any set of conditions is viewed merely as an occasion to seek a new «attic exit»—these pressure tactics will only trigger fresh rounds of escalation.

The central question of the coming weeks is whether Washington and Moscow realize that they must seal not only the official doors, but all traditional avenues for covert sabotage. Most importantly, they must find a path and a mechanism to transform Ukraine’s state system, establishing on its territory an economy and a social framework that are shielded from corruption, invested in self-sustained development, and capable of thriving amidst the technological revolution.